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 Advances in the info and communication knowledge have led to the 
emergence of Internet of things (IoT). Internet of things (loT) is worthwhile 
to members, trade, and society seeing that it generates a broad range of 
services by interconnecting numerous devices and information objects. 
Throughout the interactions among the many ubiquitous things, security 
problems emerge as noteworthy, and it is significant to set up more suitable 
solution for security protection. Nonetheless, as loT devices have limited 
resource constraints to appoint strong protection mechanisms, they are 
vulnerable to sophisticated security attacks. For this reason, a sensible 
authentication mechanism that considers each useful resource constraints and 
safety is required. Our proposed scheme uses the standards of Elliptic Curve 
digital signature scheme and evaluates systematically the efficiency of our 
scheme and observes that our scheme with a smaller key size and lesser 
infrastructure performs on par with the prevailing schemes without 
compromising the security level.
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Advances in the wired, wireless, cellular and sensor networks have left a pretty good base for the 
internet of things (IoT). It's a novel paradigm which takes account of every day physical world objects 
through enabling interplay among them via targeted addressing schemes. Internet of things (IoT) refers back 
to the network interconnection of every day devices. An IoT is a global-vast community of inter-linked 
devices uniquely addressable, headquartered on a usual communication protocol. In the IoT, persons are 
bounded by utilizing one-of-a-kind forms of computing items which might be billion in number, various in 
size, and capabilities to remain a communication with each other device. It is predictable that around 50 
billion such objects will be interconnected to the internet by means of 2020.These Devices are having 
constrained capabilities, and calculating resources ranges from Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags to 
embedded instruments, PDA, and sensor nodes. IoT joins the physical world with the information world, and 
presents ambient offerings, and applications. The IoT networks permits users, devices, and purposes in 
unique physical places to keep up a correspondence seamlessly with one another. Briefly, the IoT allows 
exceptional verbal exchange patterns like: person-to-person, person-to-object, object-to-object, and object-to-
person. Still, the decentralized and dispensed nature of the IoT face challenges in authentication, entry 
control, and identification management. There are more than a few challenges to design protection options 
within the IoT like constraints, and heterogeneous conversation, resource constraints, and dispensed nature. 
Identity management of devices in the IoT is likely one of the primary task, and can be completed by using 
effective authentication schemes that are easy, secure, and lightweight. In the IoT, there are abundant 
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numbers of heterogeneous things chatting to each other. Every single device will have to be able to 
authenticate for the period of the short time. Due to the size of economics, more than enormous quantities of 
things may just request authentication approval at the same time. To this intention, lightweight, scalable, and 
secure authentication scheme is essential with the intention to authenticate organizations of devices, and now 
not the individual devices to obtain comfortable group communication. 
 
 
2. ELLIPTIC CURVE ARITHMETIC 
Elliptic curve cryptography is based on the arithmetic of points on an elliptic curve [1],[2]. Elliptic 
curves are characterized by cubic equations alike to those used for computing the circumference of an ellipse. 
An elliptic curve E over a field K is defined by a equivalence [3]:  
 
y2+ a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6  (1) 
 
Where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6∈ k and ∆ ≠ 0, where ∆ is defined as follows:  
 
∆ = -d22 d8 — 8d34 — 27d26 + 9d2d4d6;  
 
Where d2 = a12 + 4a2, 
d4 = 2a4 + a1a3, 
d6 = a23+ 4a6 and  
d8 = a12a6 + 4a2a6ala3a4 + a2a23a24 
 
Set of all points (x, y), which fulfils the above equation, are the points on the elliptic curve. The 
quantity of points on an elliptic curve, n, is the order of elliptic curve, (#(E(Fp)). The set of points of E (Fp) 
composed with addition operation forms an abelian group with point at infinity, ∞ as the identity element. 
The Equality {1} is called as weierstrass equation. The condition ∆ ≠ 0 ensures that the elliptic curve is 
plane, i.e, there are no points at which the curve has two or more divergent tangent lines. 
If the field representative P is not equal to 2 or 3 i.e., prime field, and then the permissible change of 
Variables (x, y) →((x-3a12-12a2)/36, (y-3a1x)/216- (a13+4a1a2-12a3)/36) transform E to the curve,  
 
Y2 = x3+ ax + b; where a, b ∈ k  (2) 
 
The ∆ is 16(4a3+ 27b2) 
 
2.1. Point Addition  
Totaling of points on an elliptic curve is defined by Chord and Tangent rule. Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = 
(x2, y2) be the two dissimilar points on an elliptic curve E. Then the sum R, of P and Q, is defined as follows: 
Draw a line attaching P and Q spread it to intersect the elliptic curve at a third point. At that point, the sum R, 
is the negative of the third point. Negative of a point is defined by reflection of the point near the x-axis. The 
double R, of P, is defined as follows: Draw the tangent line to the elliptic curve at P. Let it interconnects the 
elliptic curve at another point. Then the double R is the reflection of this point near the x-axis.  
 
2.2. Point Multiplication  
It is also known as Scalar multiplication. It the arithmetic operation which calculates kp where k is 
an integer and p is a point on elliptic curve. It is completed by repetitive addition. For instance Q = kp means 
Q is achieved by adding p*k times to itself (p + p + p....k times). Cryptanalysis involves determining k given 
P and Q. This procedure dominates the implementation time of elliptic curve cryptographic schemes. 
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Figure 1. The implementation time of elliptic curve cryptographic schemes 
 
 
2.3. Operations defined for E(Fp): y2 = x3+ax +b   
1. Identity: P + ∞ = ∞ + P = P for all >∈E(Fp)   
2. Negatives: If P = (x,y)∈ E(FP), then (x,y) + (x, -y) = ∞. The point (x, -y) is denoted by –P and is called 
negative of P. Note that P indeed is a point in E(FP).   
3. Point Addition: Let P=(x1,y1)∈ E(K) and Q=(x2,y2)∈ E(K) ; where P≠+Q, then P+Q = (x3,y3) where, x3 = 
(y2 - y1 / x2 – x1 )2  - x1 – x2  and y3 = (y2 - y1 / x2 – x1 )2  (x1 – x3 )  - y1  
4. Point Doubling: Let P=(x1,y1)∈ E(K), then 2P = (x3,y3) where,  x3 = (3x12 + a / 2 y1)2  - 2x1  and y3 = (3x12 + 
a / 2 y1)2  (x1 – x3 )  - y1   
 
2.4. Elliptic Curve Discrete logarithm problem 
Assumed elliptic curve parameters and a point P ∈E(Fp), find the unique integer k, 0 ≤ k≤  n1, such 
that P=kG, where n1 is order of E. ECDLP is alike to the Discrete Logarithm Problem and is the elliptic 
curve referent of DLP. In the ECDLP, the subgroup Zp* is altered by the group of points on an elliptic curve 
over a finite field. In addition, unlike the Discrete Logarithm Problem and integer factorization problem, no 
sub exponential-time algorithm is known for the ECDLP. ECDLP is considered to be significantly stronger 




3. ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY 
The usage of Elliptic Curve Cryptography was primarily advised by Neal Koblitz [4] and Victor S. 
Miller [5]. Elliptic curve cryptosystems over finite field have some benefits like the key size can be 
considerably smaller compared to additional cryptosystems like RSA, Diffie-Hellman since only exponential-
time attack is known so far if the curve is carefully chosen [4],[6] and Elliptic Curve Cryptography depend 
on the difficulty of explaining the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem ECDLP, which states that, 
“Given an elliptic curve E well-defined on a finite field FP , a point P∈E (FP) of an order n, and a point Q∈E 
(FP) , find the integer k ∈ [0,n −1] such that Q = k P. The integer k is named as the discrete logarithm of Q to 
the base P, denoted k = logPQ”.  
 
3.1. Elliptic Curve Encryption/Decryption 
Consider a message ‘Pm’ directed from A to B. ‘A’ picks a random positive integer ‘k’, a private 
key ‘nA’ and produces the public key PA = nA× G and produces the cipher text ‘Cm’ be made up of pair of 
points Cm = {kG, Pm + kPB} where G is the base point selected on the Elliptic Curve, PB = nB × G is the 
public key of B with private key ‘nB’. To decrypt the cipher text, B reproduces the 1st point in the pair by 
B’s secret & deducts the result from the 2nd point Pm + kPB – nB(kG) = Pm + k(nBG) – nB(kG) = Pm. 
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4. DIGITAL SIGNATURE SCHEMES 
Digital signatures are being used to attain integrity, non-repudiation and authentication of the digital 
data in transmission among dissimilar end users. Digital signature offers correct architecture for sending 
secure messages by way of utilizing exceptional algorithms. The digital signature algorithms commonly 
consisting of three sub phases:  
1) Key generation symmetric or asymmetric algorithm.   
2) Signing algorithm.   
3) Signature verification algorithm 
The symmetric key algorithm generates single key that is shared by sender and receiver. On other 
hand, the asymmetric key algorithm generates two keys: public and private keys. The public keys are shared 
between two parties; in contrast the private keys are keeping secret. During second phase signing algorithm 
the digital signature is generated by taken plain text i.e. private key, sensitive data, and message as input. 
After that, the sender sends the message along with generated signature to the intended recipient. Signature 
verification algorithm is executed at recipient end to ensure the received data [7]. A valid digital signature 
gives a receiver the reason to admit message and ensure the message was created and communicated by a 
known sender, not altered in transit. Digital signature has numerous schemes, such as RSA, DSA and 
ECDSA, which are used to impose the security of different transaction [7]. Digital signature schemes were 
enhanced in order to overcome some of vulnerabilities. Some improvement techniques of digital signature 
schemes are attained with respect to various perceptions. 
 
 




In RSA, it is fault tolerance perspective, whereas in DSA, they are speed of operation computational 
perspective and longtime of computations perspective. And in ECDSA, they are efficiency perspective and 
speed of operation computational perspective 
 
 
5. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
The performance measurements have been categorized according to the dependent variables. 
References [8] regarding the chosen algorithms with respect to their performance and compared to the level 
of security provided. 
 
 
Table 1. The performance measurements according to the dependent variables 
 Algorithm Family Security level (in bits) 80 128 192 256 
RSA Integer factorization 1024 3072 7680 15360 
DSA Discrete logarithm 1024 3072 7680 15360 
ECDSA Elliptic Curves 160 256 384 512 
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RSA and DSA algorithms are suspended from improvement of their performance for the reason that 
installing such algorithm on light-weight devices will adversely affect their performances and delay the 
decryption process. ECDSA in equivalent could be a auxiliary for RSA & DSA system, their comptability to 
be installed in any system with different memory sizes and CPU description and parameters, ECDSA provide 
the same level of security as RSA and DSA but with smaller keys: The lesser key sizes of ECDSA possibly 
allow for less computationally able light-weight devices and wireless systems to use cryptography for secure 
data transmissions, data verification and offers less heat generation and less power consumption, less storage 
space and offers an optimized memory and bandwidth and faster signature generation. 
 
 
6. EXISTING SYSTEM 
The scheme is apt for a signer who has limited computing capability like, a signer using his smart 
Card which stocks his secret key and displays a message on a external Key pair phase of this scheme is same 
as the ECDSA scheme.  
 
6.1. Signature Generation 
Using sender’s private key, sender generates the signature for message M using the subsequent 
steps: 
(1) Select a unique and unpredictable integer k in the interval [1,n-1] 
(2) Compute kg = (x1,y1), where x1 is an integer 
(3) Compute r = x1 mod n; If r = 0, then go to step 1 
(4) Compute h =H(M), where H is the SHA-512[9] 
(5) Compute s = k-1(h + dr) mod n; If s = 0, then go to step1 
(6) The signature of sender for message M is the integer pair (r, s) 
 
6.2. Signature Verification  
The receiver can authorize the authenticity of sender’s signature (r, s) for message M with the aid of 
execution the following:  
(1) Obtain signatory A’s public key (E, q, n, Q) 
(2) Verify that values r and s are in the interval [1,n-1] 
(3) Compute w = s-1 mod n. 
(4) Compute h = H(M), where H is the same secure hash algorithm used by A. 
(5) Compute u1 = hw mod n 
(6) Compute u2 = rw mod n 
(7) Compute u1G + u2Q = (x0,y0) 
(8) Compute v = x0 mod n 
(9) The signature for message M is verified only if v = r 
 
6.3. A Possible attack  
The secret key k used for signing two or more messages will have to be produced separately. In 
particular, additional secret k should be used for signing select messages, in any other case the private key d 
can also be recovered. However if a random or pseudo-random number generator is used, then the threat of 
making a repeated k value is negligible. If same secret k is used to produce signature of two different 
messages m1 and m2 then and there it will effect in two signatures (r,s1) and (r, s2).  
 s1= k-1(h1 + dr)  
 s2 = k-1(h2 + dr); where h1 = SHA512 (m1) and h2 = SHA512 (m2).  
 ks1- ks2 = h1+dr-h2-dr  
 k = (h1-h2)/ (s1-s2)  
 d = (ks-h)/r 
 
7. PROPOSED SYSTEM 
In this variant there is no need to find inverse in each key generation and signing section. This 
scheme is developed without modular inversion process in Signature generation and Verification algorithms.  
 
7.1. Notations 
To be appropriate in explanation of our work the elements are defined as 
d: private key  
Q: Public key  
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m: message  
H() : a secure one-way hash function  
r, s1, s2: Signature elements  
q: field order  
FR: field representation  
a, b: coefficients  
G: base point  
n: Order of G  
h: co-factor  
 
7.2. Key pair Generation 
Key pair d and Q made by the Signer as follows 
INPUT: D= (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h)  
(1) Choose a distinctive and unpredictable integer, d, within the interval [1, n-1]  
(2) Compute Q ← (dg) 
(3) Return (Q, d)  
OUTPUT: Q, d  
 
7.3. Signature Generation  
The signer can sign message m as follows 
INPUT: D= (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h), d, m  
Begin  
repeat 
k = Random [1, 2,…, n-1]  
P = kG 
c=X-Co-ordinate (P) 
e = H (m) mod n 
s1 = eck mod n 
s2 = (dc + 1)k mod n 
R = eP 
r = X-Co-ordinate(R) 
until r ≠ 0 and s1 ≠ 0 and s2 ≠ 0 return (r, s1, s2) 
End 
OUTPUT: Signature (r, s1, s2)  
 
7.4. Signature Verification  
To verify the signature (r, s1, s2) on message m, receiver does the following: 
INPUT: D= (q, FR, a, b, G, n, h), Q, m, Signature (r, s1, s2) 
Begin 
ifr, s1, s2 doesn’t belongs to [1,…, n-1] then 
Return (“Reject the signature”) 
end if 
e= H(m) 
t = es2 
U1 = tG 
U2 = s1Q 
W= U1 – U2 
v= X-Co-ordinate (W) 
if v = r then 
Return (“Accept the signature”) 
else 
Return (“Reject the signature”) 
end if 
end 
OUTPUT: Acceptance or rejection of the signature. 
 
7.5. Proof Of Signature Verification 
We begin with W=U1-U2 
By substituting U1 with tG and U2 with s1Q 
                ISSN: 2088-8708 
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W = tG - s1Q 
By substituting t with es2 and Q with dG 
W = es2G - s1dG 
By substituting s1 with ec and s2 with (dc + 1)k 
W  = e(dc +1)kG – ecdG 




v =X-Co-ordinate (W) and 
r = X-Co-ordinate(R) 
Therefore v = r. 
K cannot be resolute although similar secret key is used to sign two different messages. So this 
System is not vulnerable to attack on same secret. 
 
 
8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
ECC can be implemented in software and hardware [10]. Software ECC implementation provide 
moderate speed, higher power consumption and also have very limited physical security w.r.t key storage. 
Where as hardware implementation improves performance in terms of flexibility. Also hardware 
implementation provides greator security since they cannot be easily modified or read by an outside attacker. 
This section represents implementation results of our Proposed Scheme 
Basepoint = (425826231723888350446541592701409065913635568770, 
203520114162904107873991457957346892027982641970) 
Jaya Bhaskar in genkey 
Basepoint::genKey = (425826231723888350446541592701409065913635568770, 
203520114162904107873991457957346892027982641970) 
private_A = 340282366920938463463374607431768211455 




public_A = (193596275460689438633057135026141223361451460712, 
852585631030044873710352501553333148377145666126) 
Public_A on the curve is true 
 
8.1. Signature Generation 
Select random number = 1461501637330902918203687197606826779884164804961 
Compute base point * random number=P 
P = (531158657844619155995167414799432702697095257705, 
180344918645894974651218273328989218431680509576) 




Original Message: Paul hated school. He did not do his home 




R=eP = (989057722868231206769763389899805110651529187912, 
203391433094767912595600396278362218599518528912 
r=x-co-ord(R) = 989057722868231206769763389899805110651529187912 
 




Original Message: Paul hated school. He did not do his home 
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E = 928716468173736156677920779206089815048437287012 
t=es2G = 660542466286145164871991432880014098834552069294 
Compute U1=tG = (867656430810165309875458600806608047488460704882, 
1293539316315317053662292883889929244439313430206) 
ComputeU2=s1Q = (717328242418199929353762269878388819398405647418, 
103204733856296699857680824765381683296090977735) 
ComputeW=U1-U2 = (989057722868231206769763389899805110651529187912, 
203391433094767912595600396278362218599518528912) 
v=x-coord(W) = 989057722868231206769763389899805110651529187912 
We obtain v=r, hence Signature is accepted 
 
We compare the results of ECDSA and our proposed system that presents the no of Point Addition 
and Scalar Multiplication operations for Signing and Signature Verification process. ECDSA uses inversion 
operation in both signing and Signature Verification but our Proposed System doesn’t use any inversion 
operations in Signing and Signature Verification. We implemented original ECDSA and our proposed 
scheme and compared their performance over Elliptic Curve and presented the results below.  
 
 
Table 2. Implemented original ECDSA and our proposed scheme and compared their performance over 
Elliptic Curve 
Algorithm ECDSA Proposed Algorithm 
No. of Secret keys 1 1 
Inverse in Signing Yes No 
No. of  scalar Multiplication operations in signing 1 2 
Inverse in Signature Verification Yes No 
No. of Point Addition operations in Verification 1 1 
No. of scalar Multiplication operations in Verification 2 2 
 
 
From Figure 3 Proposed Signature scheme implemented poorly in signature generation since 












Figure 3. Proposed Signature scheme 
 
 
From Figure 4, proposed scheme signature verification algorithm performed better when compared 
to the existing verification scheme. This is desirable because to the application-oriented point of view, 
message is authorized by the individual only once, but verification may be required many times.  
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Figure 4. Proposed scheme signature verification algorithm 
 
 
Our applications requiring Signature verification more frequently than Signature Generation, hence 




In the Existence system, if the same random number is generated which is used to sign the message, 
then there is a chance of decrypting the private key by the attacker. But in our proposed scheme, even if the 
same random number is used attacker can’t decrypt the private key. Modular inversion operation is additional 
time consuming operation [11] for constrained devices. Our proposed Digital Signature scheme is developed 
without modular inversion process in Signature generation and Verification algorithms. But modular 
inversion operation is used in existence system. Considering the above, our proposed digital signature 
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